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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
The court also reversed the trial
court's award of statutory penalties
under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
22:658(B) (West Supp. 1985).
Aida M. Alaka

Exclusive Warranties
Failing In Essential
Purpose Do Not Prevent
Consequential Damage
Recovery
In Ragen Corp. v. Kearney &
Trecker Corp., 912 F.2d 619 (3d
Cir. 1990), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that warranties containing exclusive remedies, which fail in
their essential purpose, do not preclude recovery for consequential
damages under Wisconsin law.
Background
Ragen Corporation ("Ragen")
was a New Jersey manufacturer of
component parts for computers
and nuclear reactors. Since 1955,
Ragen conducted business with
Kearney & Trecker Corporation
("K & T"), a Wisconsin corporation that manufactured high-speed
machining equipment.
In 1976, K & T began manufacturing the MM800, a fully automated machine designed to drill
metal castings. For approximately
two years, K & T discussed the
MM800 with Ragen and submitted
a proposal to Ragen for the sale of
MM800 units in April 1978. The
proposal described the MM800 in
detail and specified the conditions
of the proposed sale.
K & T's proposal stated that the
entire and exclusive warranty for
the MM800 was either (1) repair or
replacement of the defective part
or product; or, at K & T's option,
(2) return of the product and refund of the purchase price. Furthermore, the proposal stipulated
that under no circumstances would
K & T be liable for any consequential damages arising in connection
with the MM800. The proposal
also provided that Wisconsin law
would govern any resulting contracts between K & T and Ragen.
Ragen sent purchase orders to K
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& T for eight MM800 machines. In
January, 1979, K & T installed the
first two MM800 units at Ragen's
plant. Soon thereafter, the
MM800s began to malfunction. In
late 1979, after the installation of
the next two units, Ragen discovered defects in the MM800s.
Pursuant to its warranty, K & T
repaired and serviced the MM800
units at Ragen's plant over the next
five years. However, these efforts
provided only a temporary solution to the problem. Prior to and
after repair, the machines could
not operate at, or near, their capacity.
Along with the MM800 problems, Ragen also experienced difficulties with four Eb/1624 machines. Ragen had previously
purchased these units from K & T,
which retrofitted them to operate
like the MM800. In November
1980, and March 1982, Ragen cancelled orders to purchase other
machines from K & T.
In August 1981, in response to
Ragen's threat to cancel orders for
the remaining MM800 units, K &
T offered to aid Ragen in maintaining an 85% operating capacity
for the MM800s, if Ragen also
agreed to perform preventive
maintenance on the machines. Ragen accepted K & T's proposal and
did not revoke the orders for the
remaining MM800 units. However, by 1982, Ragen realized that K
& T could not sustain the 85%
operating capacity for the MM800
units; Ragen also had not been
maintaining the machines as
agreed. Subsequent negotiations
between the parties failed. Ragen
discontinued business with K & T.
In July 1983, Ragen filed suit
against K & T in the United States
District Court for the District of
New Jersey. Ragen claimed breach
of warranty, design defect, and
fraud against K & T for the
MM800 and retrofitted Eb/1624
units. K & T counterclaimed, contending that Ragen breached the
purchase contracts for machines
other than the MM800s. In its
decision, the district court awarded Ragen compensation only for
direct damages resulting from K &
T's breach of warranty. Additionally, the court rejected K & T's
counterclaim. Both parties ap-

pealed the court's verdict to the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit.
The District Court's Opinion
The district court first determined the parties' contractual
rights and liabilities. Using the
terms contained in K & T's proposal, the district court concluded that
Ragen's contractual remedy was
limited to repair or replacement of
the defective machines; the contract explicitly excluded recovery
for any consequential damages.
The court held that this explicit
exclusion was not unconscionable.
Next, the district court addressed Ragen's breach of warranty claim. The court agreed with
Ragen's claim that the MM800s
suffered from design defects which
constituted a breach of warranty.
Therefore, the contract entitled
Ragen to seek the repair or replacement of the MM800s. However,
since K & T was unable to repair
adequately or replace the defective
MM800 units, the court found that
the limited remedy failed in its
essential purpose. Consequently,
in order to provide an appropriate
remedy, the district court decided
to apply section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC").
Section 2-719 allows a court to
apply any remedy available under
the UCC for a contract breach,
such as Ragen's, whose limited
warranty failed in its essential purpose. Using this rule, the court
concluded that the only remedy
Ragen could pursue was section
2-714(2), UCC § 2-714(2) (1989),
which allowed Ragen to recover
direct damages amounting to the
difference in value between the
MM800 units as received and the
MM800 units as warranted. Although Ragen failed to submit evidence showing the difference in
value between the MM800s as received and the MM800s as warranted, the district court awarded
Ragen damages based on its own
estimate of direct damages.
The district court did not address Ragen's fraud claims against
K & T. Also, due to apparent
confusion concerning machine
identities, it is unclear whether the
court decided the claims concern(continued on page 68)
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ing the Eb/1624 machines. Finally,
the court rejected K & T's breach
of contract counterclaim against
Ragen.
The Third Circuit's Opinion
The Third Circuit reversed the
lower court's holding that Wisconsin state law denied Ragen consequential damages. The court concluded that the exclusive limited
warranties which failed in their
essential purpose, allowed recovery for consequential damages,
even if the contract excluded such
consequential damages. Because K
& T, after extensive effort, could
not repair or replace the machines
to make them perform as warranted, K & T's exclusive warranty
failed in its essential purpose.
Therefore, the court reversed the
district court's decision that Ragen
was not entitled to recover consequential damages, despite explicit
exclusion of such damages in the
warranty. The court remanded the
issue of consequential damages for
retrial.
The Third Circuit then reviewed
the district court's decision to
award Ragen direct damages. The
court stated that in order for Ragen
to recover direct damages, Ragen
must present evidence of losses, on
which a reasonable assessment of
damages may be based. The court
reasoned that this required Ragen
to produce evidence showing the
actual value of the MM800 units it
received and the value of the units
as warranted. Ragen, however, only submitted evidence on (1) the
purchase price of the MM800, (2)
the average up-time of the machines, and (3) the average up-time
of similar machines in the industry. The court decided that this
evidence was insufficient to prove
adequately the actual value of the
MM800. Therefore, the court held
that Ragen was not entitled to
direct damages and accordingly
reversed the district court's decision.
Next, the Third Circuit examined the lower court's rejection of
K & T's counterclaim against Ragen for damages allegedly arising
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from Ragen's cancellation of orders for new machines. The court
decided that the issue required
application of section 2-708(2),
UCC § 2-708(2) (1989), commonly
referred to as the "lost volume
seller" provision. Section 2-708(2)
provides that a seller may recover
lost profits in the event the standard measure of damages is inadequate. The court defined a lost
volume seller as one who could
have sold an item to both the
breaching buyer and a subsequent
buyer; the seller, having made essentially only one rather than two
sales, suffered damage which could
only be remedied by an award for
the amount of lost profits.
The Third Circuit noted that the
fundamental question in applying
the lost volume seller provision
was whether the seller had the
ability to provide the item to the
breaching buyer as well as to the
resale buyer. The court found that,
based on testimony of the case, K
& T, at the time Ragen cancelled
the orders, had more orders for
machines than it could fill. Thus,
the court concluded that K & T
could not have simultaneously
supplied both Ragen and another
buyer; K & T was not a "lost
volume seller." Thus, the court
held that K & T was not entitled to
damages and affirmed the district
court's decision.
Finally, the Third Circuit reviewed the district court's decision
on the Eb/1624 retrofitted machines. The court found that the
district court did not refer to the
Eb/1624s. Instead, the district
court had discussed a retrofitted
MM200, a machine not involved
in the case. Although the court
suspected the district court simply
misnamed the Eb/1624s, it remanded this issue for clarification.
Additionally, since the district
court did not rule on Ragen's fraud
claims, the Third Circuit remanded this issue as well.
Richard E. Nawracaj

Bankruptcy Court Holds
Debtor Responsible For
Obsessive-Compulsive
Use of Credit Card
In In re Borste, 117 Bankr. 995
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990), the
United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Washington held that a debtor's credit
card debts were not dischargeable
in bankruptcy even though the
debtor had incurred the obligations while suffering from an obsessive-compulsive disorder which
affected her ability to control her
credit card spending.
Background
Cathy Borste ("Borste"), the
debtor, was a machinist at the
University of Washington. She
earned approximately $26,000 annually. Borste used a combination
of seven credit cards to make at
least ninety-two charges from May
through August 1989, the majority
of which were for luxury items.
Prior to this period, Borste had
difficulty controlling her spending
and meeting her resulting financial
obligations. In May 1989, Borste
owed about $24,000 in secured and
unsecured debt. In June 1989,
Borste sought credit counseling but
was refused assistance. During
credit counseling, however, Borste
had learned that she could declare
personal bankruptcy.
Borste shopped extensively in
the following months. She also
travelled to Europe in early September and returned in mid-October. Upon her return, she consulted an attorney and filed a
Chapter 7 petition on November 7,
1989. Borste owed over $43,000 to
her creditors at the time she filed
for bankruptcy.
Nordstrom, Inc. ("Nordstrom"), a creditor, filed a complaint alleging that thirty-six of the
charges made to Borste's Nordstrom account were not dischargeable. Nordstrom argued that these
charges fell within the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(2)(A)
(1979), because Borste made them
with no intention of paying them.
Thus, the charges had been incurred through fraud, making
them not dischargeable.
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